State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Beyond Norris-LaGuardia by Lesnick, Howard
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1966 
State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor 
Contracts: Beyond Norris-LaGuardia 
Howard Lesnick 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Labor and 
Employment Law Commons, Labor Economics Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Studies 
Commons, Legislation Commons, Unions Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Lesnick, Howard, "State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Beyond 
Norris-LaGuardia" (1966). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1220. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1220 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
CONIMENTS 
STATE-COURT INJUNCTIONS AND THE 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF LABOR 
CONTRACTS: BEYOND NORRIS-LAGUARDIA 
H award Lesnick * 
T
HE question presented is whether federal law restricts state 
power to enjoin a strike as in violation of a collective bar­
gaining agreement. The relevant sources of federal law are the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act 1 and section 30r (a) of the Labor-Man­
agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act.2 
( r ) It seems clear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not 
itself apply to actions in state courts. It is doubtless true that 
many of the animating principles underlying the r932 statute are 
implicated whenever a strike is sought to be subjected to the 
control of equity, in state or federal court.3 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has dramatically sustained the attribution of 
substantive import to Norris-LaGuardia, despite the act's juris­
dictional language, as a legislative response to judicial interpreta­
tion of earlier statutory regulation.4 Finally, it is at least part 
of the story to note that the statute was cast as it was because of 
doubts, soon thereafter dispelled, whether Congress had power to 
make substantive law to govern labor disputes.5 The fact remains 
that the decision was made to write a statute addressed to the 
federal courts, that the problem there may have been thought at 
*Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., New York 
University, 1952; A.M., Columbia, 1953, LL.B., 1958. 
1 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1964) (prohibi­
tion of federal court injunctions in labor disputes). 
2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964): "Suits for violation of con­
tracts between an employer and a labor organization . . .  or between . . .  labor 
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without 
regard to the citizenship of the parties. " 
3 See Cox & BoK, CASES ON LABOR LAw 96-102 (6th ed. 1965). 
4United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941). 
5 See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. REv. 638, 648-49 
(1932) 0 
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least to some degree more acute, 6 and that the issue of legislative 
policy would have been significantly altered had Congress been 
asked to exercise its power to regulate commerce.7 
(2) Section 301, it is clear, does apply to state courts.8 I be­
lieve, however, that the federal law of section 301 should not be 
held to "incorporate" the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibitions 
on injunctions against strikes in breach of contract. Of course 
Norris-LaGuardia is "federal law," and "federal law" controls. 
But to settle the question so simply comes close to adjudication 
by pun. As Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl­
vania put the matter: 9 
Appellant contends that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an expression 
of federal labor policy and as such must be incorporated within and 
made an integral part of the national labor policy expressed in 
Section 301. Even so, it does not follow that the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, if woven into the fabric of Section 301, would express a na­
tional labor policy to prohibit the granting of injunctive relief by 
state courts . . . .  
Certainly the setting of neither the 1932 nor the 1947 legislative 
expression of national labor policy warrants "incorporation" of 
Norris-LaGuardia.10 As for judicial pronouncements, the Su­
preme Court's Sinclair Refining decision 11 says no more than 
6 Federal question jurisdiction prior to I93 2 involved use of the Sherman Act, 
with results that Congress sought to reverse with Norris-LaGuardia. See Milk 
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 3II U.S. 9I (I940); 
Witte, supra note 5, at 649 n.2o. Diversity jurisdiction in the pre-Erie period en­
abled federal judges to fashion more restrictive rules than were being developed in 
the courts of some states. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Duplex 
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 483 (I92I). For an illustration of at­
tempts to create diversity jurisdiction in labor disputes, see Fortney v. Carter, 203 
Fed. 454 (4th Cir. I9I3) (bondholders of struck corporation, alleging threat to their 
security interests, permitted to sue strikers). 
7 See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, I6 MINN. L. REV. 638 (1932). 
Cj. Comment, II3 U. PA. L. REv. I096, rror (I965): 
It would seem illegitimate for a court to accept as a basis for common-law 
development a policy which, although desired by the proponents of the bill, 
was considered by them too weak to survive the political process and which, 
even if an accurate reflection of the mood of Congress, never found expression 
in law. 
8 Local IJ4, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
9 Shaw Elec. Co. v. IBEW, 418 Pa. I, II, 208 A.2d 769, 775 (I965). 
10 See the discussions in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union 
of Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837, 852-53 (3d Cir. I964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 
935 (I965); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 
2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (I957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (I958); Shaw Elec. 
Co. v. IBEW, 4I8 Pa. I, Io n.I4, 208 A.2d 769, 774 n.I4 (I965). 
11 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (I962) (federal court may not 
enjoin strike in breach of contract). 
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that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to strikes in breach of 
contract no less than to organizational or bargaining strikes, and 
that section 301 cannot be taken to repeal that act, or to authorize 
inroads upon its protection. There was no assumption of judicial 
responsibility to weigh the need to protect concerted activities 
against the danger to the security of contractual arrangements. 
Indeed the Court eschewed any such roleY In such a context it 
would be intolerable to find in the uniformity principle of Lucas 
Flour r:; a sufficient ground for compelling state conformity to the 
strictures of Norris-LaGuardia. The channeling of litigation into 
state courts because of the availability of injunctive relief there 
may be unfortunate/4 but something more is needed to justify 
federal invalidation of state law. Since a uniform rule permitting 
specific enforcement of no-strike clauses was rejected, not as a 
result of the Court's own fashioning of an appropriate rule of 
federal labor law, but simply in obedience to the legislative man­
date that federal judges not enjoin strikes/5 that rejection (proper 
12 
[W]e do not see how cases implementing the purpose of § 301 can be said to 
have freed this Court from its duty to give effect to the plainly expressed con­
gressional purpose with regard to the continued application of the anti-injunc­
tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The argument to the contrary 
seems to rest upon the notion that injunctions against peaceful strikes are 
necessary to make the arbitration process effective. But whatever might be 
said about the merits of this argument, Congress has itself rejected it. In doing 
so, it set the limit to which it was willing to go in permitting courts to effectu­
ate the congressional policy favoring arbitration and it is not this Court's 
business to review the wisdom of that decision. 
ld. at 213. See also id. at 2IO: "When the repeal of a highly significant law is 
urged upon [Congress] . . .  and that repeal is rejected after careful consideration 
and discussion, the normal expectation is that courts will be faithful to their trust 
and abide by that decision." 
These excerpts suggest the accuracy of reading Sinclair as it was read in 
Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1096, noo (1965): "It did not make the positive 
determination that a new general anti-injunction policy existed; it made the nega­
tive determination that section 301 did not alter the old, limited anti-injunction 
policy of Norris-LaGuardia." 
13 Local I74, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, ro3 (1962): 
"[T]he subject matter of§ 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law. ' ... 
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under 
state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the 
negotiation and administration of collective agreements." 
14 See Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 
370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962); Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some 
Unanswered Questions, 63 CoLUM . L. REv. 1027, 1034-36 (1963); Summers, Labor 
Law Decisions of Supreme Court, 1961 Term, in ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS 
LAW PROCEEDINGS $1, 63 (1962). 
15 Consistent with its view that it was not making law, the Court in Sinclair 
did not even consider the effect of its decision on state power. See Mr. Justice 
Brennan's dissenting opinion, 370 U.S. at 226. 
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though it was 16) should not now be parlayed with a revived 
interest in practical accommodations and judicial creativity to 
compel the states to obey a mandate never addressed to them. 
(3) The matter is not closed, however, by a judgment that the 
federal law of section 301 does not incorporate Norris-LaGuardia. 
The anti-injunction statute aside, it seems clear that the conditions 
governing the availability of injunctive relief should not be re­
garded as "procedural" for the purpose of deciding the choice of 
governing law. The question is nothing less "substantive" than 
the balance to be struck between the need to vindicate contract 
rights through specific performance and the dangers to protected 
concerted activities of permitting equity to exercise its fearsome 
powers too close by. Had Congress never enacted the 1932 statute, 
we would long since have seen the development of a corpus of 
federal rulings dealing with injunctions in labor disputes. Some 
would have been the product of judicial decisions/7 others em­
bodied in the Federal Rules/8 other enacted by the legislature.19 
These principles would govern federal court actions, and the 
Supreme Court would have authority to decide whether effectu­
ation of the purposes of the extensive federal regulatory scheme 
in the labor-management field called for similar restrictions on 
state power to enforce no-strike clauses.20 
16 See Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process, 
72 YALE L. J. 1547, 1559, 1563-66 (1963) ("A proper accommodation-one that 
best serves the policy of section 301 without undermining the purposes of Norris­
LaGuardia-seemingly would allow a district court to enjoin a breach of contract 
strike over an arbitrable grievance. " " [ But] resolution of contested issues touching 
upon sensitive areas of our social and economic life should be made by the elector­
ally based and therefore responsive political institutions.") 
17 See the celebrated opinion of Judge Amidon in Great No. Ry. v. Brous­
seau, 286 Fed. 414 (D.N.D. 1923). 
18 See FED. R. Crv. P. 65 (injunctions). 
19See National Labor Relations Act§ ro(l), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 
29 U.S.C. § 16o(l) (r964) (interlocutory injunction relief in NLRB proceedings); 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1964) (interlocutory orders of district courts regarding 
injunctive relief appealable to courts of appeals). 
2° Cf. Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions- The Converse 
of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHio Sr. L. J. 384, 387 (1956): 
[W]hen federally-created rights are enforced in the state courts .. . the 
cardinal consideration is federal paramountcy . . . .  Moreover, federal para­
mountcy extends as much to procedural as to substantive matters; if the federal 
purpose is clear, and if it is valid, there is no room for local procedural auton­
omy . . .  and this is true whether the federal purpose is evidenced by an 
express Congressional enactment of a "procedural" character or is reasonably 
inferable from the substantive federal right in issue. 
Even a firm adherent of a "general rule . . .  that federal law takes the state 
courts as it finds them," Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
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An affirmative answer would often be called for. The federal 
law whose application Lincoln Mills prescribes is one "which the 
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." 21 
One can, I believe, sum up the themes of federal concern with 
reasonable accuracy in a few words, although documentation 
would require a sensitive recollection of two generations of 
history. The core of the danger is improvident inhibition of pro­
tected strikes -in practice not often undone by subsequent lift­
ing of the restraint- through fallible factfinding or overbroad 
decrees.22 The development of the preemption doctrine has made 
clear the central concern, in the Court's perception of national 
labor policy, that protected concerted activities have "breathing 
space to survive." 23 There is a strong federal interest in assuring 
that the remedial scheme by which contract rights are vindicated 
does not encroach unduly on protected activities.24 Breach-of­
contract suits are of course not removed from judicial cognizance, 
whether state or federal,25 but a state may now vindicate state-
CoLuM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954), would presumably acknowledge a greater concern 
with the impact of state "procedure" when it is the federal rights of defendants 
(rather than plaintiffs) that are at stake. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 397 (1953) (jurisdiction of state court to hear 
federal defense). As for the "defense " of removal, see note 36 infra. 
21 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). 
22 To elaborate this problem here would by now be superfluous. See, e.g., Aaron, 
Labor Injunctions in the State Courts- Part II: A Critique, so VA. L. REv. II47, 
1156-58 (1964). 
23 The phrase is Mr. Justice Brennan's, referring to first amendment rights, in 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). In the labor context, see Liner v. 
Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306-o8 (1964) (danger that state law of mootness would 
hinder NLRB determination of legal status of picketing) ; Local 438, Construction 
Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 550 (1963) (danger that temporary injunction, if 
not appealable to Supreme Court, would "effectively dispose" of union's right to 
picket); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953) (danger that state 
would enjoin picketing that NLRB would permit). 
24 Even when state substantive law is permitted to operate, as in the case of 
"right to work" laws, the Court has proscribed equitable relief against strikes or 
picketing that is aimed at obtaining a union-security agreement violative of state 
law, Local 438, Construction Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), while permit­
ting the state to invalidate or hold actionable a union-security arrangement ob­
tained through collective bargaining. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 
U.S. 96 (1963). A substantial reason for holding that state power "begins only 
with actual negotiation and execution " of the agreement, see id. at 105, is the 
danger of permitting state court litigation about the object of concerted activities 
to constrain protected conduct "erroneously" found to have a forbidden object. 
See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953). 
25 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (NLRB jurisdiction does 
not preclude judicial jurisdiction); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 
502 (1962) (federal court jurisdiction does not preclude that of state courts). 
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created rights only to the extent that they conform to the evolving 
federal law of labor contracts.26 Indeed, description of the con­
tract rights in question as "state-created/' while doubtless an 
accurate reflection of the traditions that move a state court to 
grant or deny a right of action, can probably claim no better 
legal credentials than those accorded harmless error.27 Federal law 
should set the outer limits of the availability of injunctive relief 
in actions governed by section 301. 
(4) The question therefore remains: What is the content of 
the relevant federal law? Some immediately visible problem 
areas can be readily perceived. The greater difficulty is to strike 
a proper balance between the demands of federal labor policy 
and of state procedural autonomy. The case that seems to me 
easiest to resolve in favor of federal restraint is the use of ex parte 
restraining orders. Here lies the greatest danger to federally pro­
tected rights.28 At the same time, the interference with state pro­
cedure is relatively slight. I would argue that the spirit of Rule 
6 5 (b) 29 and NLRA section IO ( l) 30 must be observed, and 
that restraining orders should not be issuable without notice ex­
cept on a recitation of immediate need and (more important) 
should be limited to a short time certain, not renewable ex parte. 
More difficulty surrounds the procedure governing preliminary 
injunctions. One can readily state the requisites of full protec­
tion: an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on demand; 
26 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962). 
A broader reading of the Dowd Box, Lucas Flour, and Evening News cases, as 
rendering all of the underlying aims of the preemption doctrine wholly inapplicable 
to § 301 actions, is not warranted by the decisions. 
27 State substantive rules of contract law must bow when they would hold 
actionable what federal law deems lawful, see id. at 105 n.r4, and when they 
would treat as permitted what under federal law is sufficient to constitute a breach. 
Cf. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Court 
has not, to my knowledge, given any support to the view that state substantive 
law is permitted to operate as such within a "zone of reasonableness " set by federal 
law. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) ("any 
state law applied ... will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independ­
ent source of private rights"); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 
supra note 26, at 102; American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of 
Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 83 7, 857 (3d Cir. 1964) (Hastie, J ., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965). 
28 For the still-classic statement of the problem of "temporary " equitable relief, 
see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 200-02 (1930); on ex parte 
applications, see id. at 223. 
29FED. R. Crv. P. 65 (b). 
30 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 16o(l) (1964). 
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appellate or similar 31 review within the state system; 32 capacity 
of respondents under the restraint of a preliminary injunction to 
bring the proceedings promptly on for final hearing if desired. 
Here, however, countervailing considerations seem stronger. Is 
it appropriate for federal common law to prescribe a particular 
allocation of judicial responsibilities within the state system? 33 
Assuming the availability of Supreme Court review of injunc­
tions issued by lower state courts and not appealable under state 
law/4 does the relative inadequacy of the certiorari mechanism 
and its procedures for determining the question of a stay pending 
review warrant federal insistence on a state's creation or expan­
sion of intramural avenues of redress? 
The question of the availability of injunction bonds presents, 
in my view, a relatively weaker federal need. The aim of bond 
requirements is twofold: to discourage improper resort to equity 
through a financial deterrent, and to provide some recompense for 
respondents wrongly denied self-help at the time they chose to 
resort to it. When the procedures by which a state litigates equity 
suits are otherwise adequate to safeguard federally protected 
rights, I would not think that this requirement is so central to 
the protection of such rights that a state must provide it. 
The thesis of this Comment is the presence of "federal law" 
apart from the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That law asks whether a 
particular aspect of a state's equity jurisprudence unduly threat­
ens the policy against erosion of federally protected concerted 
31 I have in mind here the practice of review by a court en bane of orders issued 
by a single judge. 
32 Cf. 28 U.S. C. § r292 (a) (r) (rg64) (district court issuance or denial of pre­
liminary injunction appealable to court of appeals) ; Local 438, Construction Union 
v. Curry, 37r U.S. 542 (r963) (state court issuance of preliminary injunction 
appealable to Supreme Court when federal defense litigated). 
33 It should be borne in mind that the prescription would probably be condi­
tional only. A state would be required to meet federal standards or forego the ex­
ercise of equity jurisdiction. It would, of course, be a far greater interference to tell 
a state that it was required to grant specific enforcement of no-strike clauses, but 
subject to federal restraints on the procedure for doing so. I would not think that 
the obligation of state courts to enforce federal law, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 
386 (r947), embraces any such requirement, although the problem might have 
been somewhat more difficult had Sinclair not been decided as it was. 
34 The assumption has two aspects: (a) the application of the rule of the Curry 
case, see note 32 supra, to § 30I actions; (b) characterization of the lower state 
court as the highest "in which a decision could be had " (28 U.S. C. § r257 (rg64)), 
despite the later availability, on issuance of a permanent injunction, of further 
state court review. 
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activities.35 Illustrations are needed to give flesh to the under­
lying question, and to suggest the process of forming an answer, 
but it would be premature for me to press the analysis further 
here.36 The concept of federal law applicable only in state courts 
seems a strange one. But the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an uncom­
mon piece of legislation. Its applicability to federal court 
actions prevented the development of more particularized restric­
tions on state equity jurisdiction, but its inapplicability to state 
court actions does not render inapplicable all federal concern. 
Once the demands of the federal common law are perceived, and 
the governing considerations expressed, the resolution of specific 
problems remains the task of that fallible, indispensable servant, 
"litigating elucidation." 
35 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), dealing with state law of ob­
scenity, involves the imposition of analogous requirements- burden of proof on 
the state, judicial determination of the status of the challenged film, injunctive 
relief pending judicial review limited to short fixed period-when the federal 
rights sought to be protected are of constitutional stature. New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 51 (1964), may portend a similar development in the area of 
libel. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 513 
( 1953). See also Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 340 ( 1965) (concurring opinion 
of Brennan, J .) (state postconviction remedies). 
36 Putting aside any supposed "incorporation" of Norris-LaGuardia, it seems 
clear that a court fashioning federal common law should not adopt a rule absolutely 
prohibiting specific relief against a strike in breach of contract. See, e.g., the 
discussion in Wellington & Albert, supra note 16, at 1552-59. 
If state courts are to be permitted the exercise of equity jurisdiction denied to 
federal judges by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the removal jurisdiction should not be 
read to permit an end-run around such jurisdiction. See the discussion in Comment, 
II3 U. PA. L. REv. 1096, 1097-98 (1965). 
